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Abstract 
 
Tax compliance is assumed to be shaped by three main motivations to comply: enforced, 
voluntary, and committed motivation. Taxpayers, who hold an enforced motivation to 
comply, only pay taxes because of audits and fines for non-compliance. Voluntary 
motivated taxpayers respect the law and pay taxes because it is the easiest option. 
Committed motivation represents an intrinsic motivation, whereby taxpayers feel a moral 
obligation and responsibility to be honest. However, little and inconsistent empirical 
research exists on the relationship between motivations and tax compliance. The present 
paper empirically examines the connection between motivations and reported tax 
compliance based on data from two representative samples of 500 self-employed Austrian 
taxpayers and 1,377 Dutch entrepreneurs. Results show that an enforced motivation is 
negatively related to tax compliance, whereas a committed motivation is positively 
related to compliance. Contrary to expectations, voluntary motivation is not related to tax 
compliance. Based on the present outcomes it is suggested that tax authorities should 
present themselves as legitimate and benevolent in order to decrease enforced motivations 
and to foster committed motivations and subsequent high tax compliance. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Taxpayers differ in their motivation to pay taxes (Braithwaite, 2003a; Kirchler, 
Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008). Whereas some might be motivated to pay taxes because 
of audits and severe fines, others might pay taxes because they feel a moral 
obligation to contribute their fair share. Theoretically, it is assumed that these 
different motivations also determine differences in tax compliance (Braithwaite, 
2003a; Kirchler et al., 2008; Kirchler, Kogler, & Muehlbacher, 2014). Taxpayers 
with dismissive motivations are expected to see it as less important to pay taxes 
correctly than taxpayers who are morally motivated to comply with the tax law 
(Braithwaite, Murphy, & Reinhart, 2007). However, little empirical research has 
been conducted on the relationship between motivation and tax compliance and in 
addition, this research is contradictory (Hartner, Rechberger, Kirchler, & 
Schabmann, 2008; Kirchler & Wahl, 2010).   
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Consequently, it cannot be determined if and how tax authorities should respond 
to taxpayers’ motivations. The present paper sheds light on the relationship 
between motivations and reported tax compliance by examining data of two 
representative samples of self-employed taxpayers in order to determine the 
relevance of taxpayers’ motivations for tax authorities’ policies. 
  
The slippery slope framework originally differentiated between enforced and 
voluntary motivation (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et al., 2008) and after an extension, 
now distinguishes between three different qualities of tax compliance motivations 
defined as enforced, voluntary and committed motivation (Gangl, Hofmann, & 
Kirchler, 2015). This categorization corresponds to research on general 
psychological reactions towards influence differentiating between compliance, 
identification, and internalization (Kelman, 2006). Enforced, voluntary, and 
committed motivation could be seen as representing a continuum between the two 
broad angles of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation (Feld & Frey, 2007; Frey & 
Jegen, 2001; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Extrinsic motivation emphasizes outcomes of 
behavior, e.g., working for pay, whereas intrinsic motivation reflects an inherent 
interest in the actual activity, e.g., working because of curiosity (Ryan & Deci, 
2000). Generally, it is assumed that tax compliance motivations develop within 
individuals based on their experiences, attitudes, and feelings towards taxpaying 
and the tax authority (Braithwaite, 2003a; Kirchler, 2007). This implies that tax 
authorities, through their activity, may also influence and change taxpayers’ 
motivations (Feld & Frey, 2002; Gangl et al., 2015; Kirchler et al., 2008). In the 
following, the three main motivations of tax compliance are presented according 
to the slippery slope framework (Gangl et al., 2015). 
 
Motivations of tax compliance  
 
Enforced motivation is based on the deterrent effect of audits and fines (Kirchler, 
2007; Kirchler et al., 2008). Taxpayers holding an enforced motivation only pay 
taxes when they fear audits and fines and therefore think there is no alternative to 
compliance. Such a motivation is related to the broader concept of extrinsic 
motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Taxpayers comply because it leads to a 
comparatively better financial outcome than non-compliance, i.e., not being fined 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000). Enforced motivated taxpayers feel a large social distance 
between themselves and the tax authorities and the state (Braithwaite, 2003a). 
Consequently, enforced motivated taxpayers likely have negative attitudes and 
feelings towards paying taxes (Kirchler, 1998). They may even condemn the tax 
collecting state as a thief (Sloterdijk, 2010). The state and its tax authorities are 
perceived as taking money in terms of taxes from taxpayers with the help of 
coercion and force (Kirchler et al., 2008). 
 
Voluntary motivation to pay taxes is based on positive reciprocity (Gangl et al., 
2015; Kelman, 2006). The tax law is respected and tax authorities are perceived as 
service providers who should assist taxpayers to comply with the law. Taxpayers 
in turn reciprocate and are voluntarily motivated to pay their taxes without the 
need of enforcement. However, the voluntary motivation does not represent a true 
intrinsic motivation to be compliant (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Taxpayers do not value 
the tax system itself, they rather accept its necessity, give in and capitulate 
(Braithwaite, 2003a). Voluntary motivation reflects a view that taxpayers are 
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compliant because of the law and because of tax authorities who collect taxes 
within a professional bureaucratic system. Taxes are paid voluntarily because this 
is easier than to evade them (Gangl et al., 2015). Nonetheless, voluntary 
motivated taxpayers are interested in engaging in tax avoidance and in reducing 
their tax payments within the legal framework. 
 
Committed motivation is an intrinsic motivation to be tax compliant (Feld & Frey, 
2002; Gangl et al., 2015; Kelman, 2006). Tax compliance is internalized and seen 
as a moral obligation. Tax authorities are perceived to share the same values as 
the citizens and the way taxes are collected and spent is appreciated. Taxpayers 
feel committed to the tax system and have the feeling that they actively contribute 
to societies’ well-being. Committed taxpayers do not need explicit rules and strict 
bureaucracy, because they follow the spirit of the law and not just the letter of the 
law (Gangl et al., 2015). For committed taxpayers honest taxpaying is seen as a 
natural and automatic activity. 
 
Relationship of tax motivations to tax compliance 
 
The different qualities of taxpayers’ motivations are assumed to be related to 
different types of tax compliance (Braithwaite, 2003a; Kirchler et al., 2008). Tax 
compliance can be defined as the opinion that one should cooperate with tax 
authorities and that it is important to pay taxes honestly and in time (OECD, 
2001). Taxpayers with an enforced and dismissive motivation are assumed to be 
not tax compliant. They feel it is not important to cooperate with the tax 
authorities, to pay taxes honestly or in time. In contrast, voluntarily motivated and 
committed taxpayers in particular want to pay taxes honestly and thus, should 
show high tax compliance (Braithwaite, 2003a; Gangl et al., 2015). Survey studies 
in different countries showed that taxpayers differ in their reported motivations to 
pay taxes (Braithwaite et al., 2007; Muehlbacher, Kirchler, & Schwarzenberger, 
2011). However, little empirical research exists that relates different motivations 
of taxpayers to tax compliance (Hartner et al., 2008; Kirchler & Wahl, 2010). 
Moreover, research has inconsistent results. A survey study among 300 self-
employed Austrian taxpayers indicated that both voluntary and committed 
motivations are positively related to tax compliance. No relation between 
enforced motivation and tax compliance was found (Kirchler & Wahl, 2010). In 
contrast, in two survey studies, conducted among more than 2,000 Australian 
citizens, enforced motivations assessed as defiance motivations towards tax 
paying were negatively related to tax compliance whereas committed motivations 
were not associated with tax compliance (Hartner et al., 2008). Hence, it is neither 
clear whether enforced, voluntary, and committed motivations are at all related to 
tax compliance nor which of these motivations might have negative or positive 
connections to the willingness to comply with tax obligations.  
 
Insights into the relation between tax motivations and tax compliance have a high 
practical relevance for tax authorities. If the exact relation between motivations 
and tax compliance is known, tax authorities could apply their strategies in a more 
efficient and tailored way, as suggested by the responsive regulation theory 
(Braithwaite, 2003b) and the slippery slope framework (Kirchler et al., 2008). The 
responsive regulation theory argues that taxpayers should be treated differently by 
tax authorities depending on their motivation, i.e., applying audits and fines for 
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enforced motivated taxpayers and assistance and respect for voluntary and 
committed motivated taxpayers (Braithwaite, 2003b). As most taxpayers are 
assumed to be voluntarily and committed motivated, tax authorities’ major task is 
to be perceived as service-oriented and respectful (Braithwaite, 2003a). The 
slippery slope framework claims that tax authorities should apply a specific mix 
of coercive power and legitimate power to reduce enforced and to enhance 
voluntary and committed motivations among taxpayers (Gangl et al., 2015; 
Hofmann, Gangl, Kirchler, & Stark, 2014; Kirchler et al., 2008). However, as it is 
not clear whether motivations are at all relevant for tax compliance, it cannot be 
determined whether tax authorities should respond to motivations or should 
influence motivations of taxpayers. 
 
The aim of the present study is to examine the relation between different 
motivations to pay taxes and tax compliance. We seek to gain robust results by 
conducting two studies in countries, which are similar concerning tax compliance 
measured by the extent of the shadow-economy (Buehn & Schneider, 2012). 
Further, to gain results with high external validity we used representative samples 
of self-employed taxpayers. In contrast to employed taxpayers whose taxes are 
often deducted by the employers, self-employed taxpayers have to provide all 
relevant information themselves. Hence, they are more experienced regarding tax 
paying and have more opportunities to engage in tax avoidance and tax evasion 
than employed taxpayers (Antonides & Robben, 1995). We assessed motivations 
towards taxpaying with two different methods. In Study 1, we examine the 
relationship between enforced motivation, voluntary motivation, committed 
motivation and tax compliance in a representative sample of 500 self-employed 
Austrian taxpayers. In Study 2, we confirm results of Study 1 in a representative 
sample of 1,377 Dutch entrepreneurs by using the variables “Something is taken 
from me” as a proxy for enforced motivation, “I give up something” as a proxy 
for voluntary motivation and “I contribute something” as a proxy for committed 
motivation. 
 
STUDY 1 
 
Sample 
 
The sample consisted of 500 self-employed taxpayers representative for the 
Austrian population of self-employed with respect to sex (49.9% women) and age 
(M = 44.46, SD = 10.55). Table 1 presents a detailed description of the sample 
concerning socio-demographic characteristics. 
 
Procedure and material 
 
A market research agency sent out an online questionnaire to self-employed 
Austrians who received 1.50 EUR (approximately 2 US-Dollar) for participation. 
The questionnaire consisted of several scales on tax-related issues. Four of them 
are used in the present paper: tax compliance intention, enforced compliance, 
voluntary cooperation, and committed cooperation. Tax compliance intention was 
assessed with the average of answers to six questions from Gangl et al. (2013) 
following the OECD (2001) definition of tax compliance (e.g., “To what extent do 
you think it is important that the Tax Administration receives correct and 
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complete tax returns?”; 1 = very important, 7 = absolutely not important; 
Cronbach α = .77, M = 5.44, SD = 1.11). Scales to measure tax motivations were 
adapted from Hofmann et al. (2014). Enforced compliance was assessed with the 
average of answers to four items (“When I pay taxes, I do so because a great 
many tax audits are carried out,” “When I pay taxes, I do so because I know I will 
be audited,” “When I pay taxes, I do so because the tax authority often carries out 
audits,”, “When I pay taxes, I do so because I feel forced to pay my taxes”; 
Cronbach α = .87). Voluntary cooperation was also assessed with the average of 
answers to four items (“When I pay taxes, I do so because the tax authority will 
probably reciprocate my cooperation,” “When I pay taxes, I do so because the tax 
authority treats me correctly as long as I admit mistakes,”  “When I pay taxes, I do 
so because the tax authority supports taxpayers who make unintentional 
mistakes,” “When I pay taxes, I do so, because it is easier than to deceive the tax 
authority”;  Cronbach α = .79). Finally, committed cooperation was assessed with 
four items (“When I pay taxes, I do so because it is the right thing to do,” “When I 
pay taxes, I do so because it is ultimately in everyone’s interest,”  “When I pay 
taxes, I do so because I feel a moral obligation to pay taxes,”  “When I pay taxes, 
I do so, because it is an important civic duty”; Cronbach α = .92; M = 5.04, SD = 
1.56). All questions on tax motivations were assessed on seven-point Likert scales 
with labeled endpoints 1 (I totally disagree) and 7 (I totally agree). 
 
Table 1: The relation between motivations and compliance intention in the Austrian sample 
 f / M(SD) Block 1 Block 2  
  β β r 
Female 49.0% 0.11
*
 0.10
*
 0.08 
Age  44.46 (10.55) 0.19
***
 0.16
***
 0.18
***
 
Low education 2.6% -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
Medium education 66.8% 0.04 0.04 0.02 
0- 25,000 Euro turnover 35.6% 0.00 0.03 0.02 
25,001– 50,000 Euro turnover 26.2% -0.01 -0.00 0.01 
50,001 – 100,000 Euro 
turnover 
15.0% 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
100,000 – 1,000,000 Euro 
turnover 
18.0% -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 
1-4 employees 19.2% 0.05 0.05 0.02 
5-49 employees 5.2% 0.02 0.02 -0.01 
50 < employees 0.4% -0.07 -0.04 -0.09 
Information technology 10.6% 0.01 0.00 -0.04 
Tourism 7.0% -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 
Creative industries 6.4% 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Education 5.8% 0.10
*
 0.08
*
 0.10
*
 
Financial services 5.6% 0.06 0.10 0.06 
Consulting & engineering 3.2% -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
Enforced motivation 3.83 (1.61)  -0.13
***
 -0.15
**
 
Voluntary motivation 3.56 (1.43)  0.04 0.05 
Committed motivation 5.04 (1.56)  0.47
***
 0.48
***
 
R
2
  0.07 0.31  
ΔR2   0.23***  
F  2.18
**
 10.55
***
  
ΔF   53.91***  
Max. VIF  6.06 6.06  
Note: Reference groups: male, high education, turnover of more than 1 million Euro, no 
employees, other sectors; f = frequency, M = mean, SD = standard deviation, r = Spearman or 
Pearson correlation; ΔR2 and ΔF refer to a change in R2 and F statistics; max. VIF refers to the 
largest variance inflation factor; asterisks denote significance at the 0.1% (∗∗∗), 1% (∗∗), and 5% 
(∗) level.  
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Results 
 
To examine the relation between personal motivations and tax compliance 
intention an OLS regression analysis was conducted. In a first step, we included 
socio-demographic characteristics of entrepreneurs as control variables (Block 1) 
into the regression model and in a second step, enforced motivation, voluntary 
motivation, and committed motivation (Block 2) to explain the tax compliance 
intention from motivations. Results in Table 1 show that enforced compliance was 
associated with lower tax compliance intentions whereas committed cooperation 
was related to higher tax compliance intentions. Voluntary cooperation was not 
related to tax compliance intentions. 
 
STUDY 2 
 
Sample 
 
The sample consisted of 1,377 entrepreneurs representative of the Dutch 
population of entrepreneurs with respect to sex (31.7% woman), age (M = 48.67, 
SD = 11.22), number of employees, and startups versus existing companies. A 
detailed sample description can be found in Table 2 and in Gangl et al. (2013). 
  
Procedure and material 
 
Within the Dutch Fiscal Monitor 2010, mostly conducted via online 
questionnaires, entrepreneurs were asked to indicate their motivation to pay taxes 
(“Which describes your personal feeling about paying taxes best?”) by choosing 
one of three statements: “Something is taken from me” (15.9%), “I give up 
something” (46.6%), and “I contribute something” (37.5%). Tax compliance 
intention was assessed with the same six items as in Study 1 except that a five-
point Likert scale (1 = very unimportant, 5 = very important) was used (M = 4.07, 
SD = 0.60). This tax compliance scale was used in a previously published study 
(Gangl et al., 2013), where detailed descriptions of the scale can be found. Sex, 
age, education, turn-over, number of employees, and sector were included as 
socio-demographics (Table 2). 
 
Results 
 
To examine the relation between personal motivations and tax compliance 
intention an OLS regression analysis was conducted. In a first step, we included 
socio-demographic characteristics of entrepreneurs as control variables (Block 1) 
into the regression model and in a second step the motivations to pay taxes (Block 
2) to predict the tax compliance intention by motivations. Results in Table 2 
show, similar to Study 1, that an enforced motivation measured with the feeling 
“Something is taken from me” was negatively related to tax compliance 
intentions. Likewise, the feeling “I contribute something” as a proxy for 
committed cooperation was positively related to tax compliance intentions. 
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Table 2: The relation between motivations and tax compliance intention in the Dutch sample 
 f / M(SD) Block 1 Block 2  
  β β r 
Female 31.7% .01 0.01 -0.01 
Age  48.67 (11.22) 0.06
*
 0.02 0.06
*
 
Low education 7.6% -0.00 0.01 -0.01 
Medium education 41.8% -0.02 -0.00 -0.04 
0- 25,000 euro turnover 28.5% -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 
25,001– 50,000 Euro turnover 11.3% -0.04 -0.04 0.00 
50,001 – 100,000 Euro 
turnover 
12.1% -0.03 -0.04 0.01 
100,000 – 1,000,000 Euro 
turnover 
29.6% -0.08
*
 -0.08
*
 -0.04 
1-4 employees 26.4% -0.19
*
 -0.16
+
 0.01 
5-49 employees 19.1% -0.15
+
 -0.13 -0.01 
50 < employees 2.7% -0.16
*
 -0.14
*
 -0.02 
Financial services 26.9% 0.07
*
 0.07
*
 0.09
**
 
Retail 26.9% 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Health care 7.0% 0-.01 -.01 -0.01 
Construction 6.4% -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Agriculture 4.9% -0.08
**
 -0.08
**
 -0.10
***
 
Something is taken from me 15.9%  -0.11
***
 -0.15
***
 
I contribute something 37.5%  0.09
**
 0.14
***
 
R
2
  0.03 0.05  
ΔR2   0.03  
F  2.38
**
 4.14
***
  
ΔF   17.77***  
Max. VIF  12.10 12.11  
Note: Reference groups: male, high education, turnover of more than 1 million, no employees, 
other sectors, I give up something; f = frequency, M = mean, SD = standard deviation, r = 
Spearman or Pearson correlation; ΔR2 and ΔF refer to a change in R2 and F statistics; max. VIF 
refers to the largest variance inflation factor; asterisks denote significance at the 0.1% (∗∗∗), 1% 
(∗∗), 5% (∗), and 10% (+) level. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The present paper shows that different motivations to pay taxes correspond to 
different levels of reported tax compliance. As predicted, negative feelings related 
to dismissive and enforced motivations seem to correspond to lower tax 
compliance than positive feelings related to committed motivations (Braithwaite, 
2009; Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001; Kirchler et al., 2008). In contrast with 
existing studies (Hartner et al., 2008; Kirchler & Wahl, 2010), the present 
outcomes suggest that both enforced and committed motivations relate to tax 
compliance, the former in a negative and the latter in a positive way. Voluntary 
motivation was unrelated to tax compliance. Therefore, the present paper suggests 
that enforced and committed motivations play an important role for tax decisions 
and should be considered by tax authorities. 
 
As expected, taxpayers holding an enforced motivation to pay taxes also report 
being less tax compliant (Braithwaite, 2003a; Kirchler et al., 2008). They seem to 
pay taxes only if they are forced to do so. The present results on voluntary 
motivation and tax compliance suggest that the relation between voluntary 
motivation and tax compliance could be two-fold. Voluntary motivation might 
lead to both positive and negative correlations with tax compliance which in turn 
mutually dissolve each other. Voluntary motivated taxpayers may pay taxes 
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according to the law but at the same time try to utilize legal tax holes if possible. 
Hence, overall there might be no connection between voluntary motivation and 
tax compliance. Committed motivation as an intrinsic acceptance of taxpaying 
and a felt responsibility seems to be the only motivational force which increases 
tax compliance in the present study. This outcome suggests that initiatives which 
reduce enforced motivations and foster committed motivation seem to be 
important factors to enhance tax compliance. 
 
The present result extends previous theoretical and empirical findings. As 
predicted by the responsive regulation theory, taxpayers holding an enforced 
motivation likely need more audits and fines to pay taxes than voluntarily, or 
committed motivated taxpayers (Braithwaite, 2003b). As assumed by the slippery 
slope framework, it seems a worthwhile strategy of tax authorities to change 
motivations in order to increase tax compliance (Gangl et al., 2015; Kirchler et al., 
2008). Experiments indicate that severe audits and fines which are perceived as 
applied by illegitimate and unfair authorities produce enforced motivations 
whereas audits and fines which are applied by legitimate, fair and trusted tax 
authorities lead to voluntary motivations (Hartl, Hofmann, Gangl, Hartner-
Tiefentahler, & Kirchler, 2015; Hofmann, Hartl, Gangl, Hartner-Tiefentahler, & 
Kirchler, 2014; Kirchler & Wahl, 2010; Verboon & van Dijke, 2011). Thus, the 
present results strengthen the assumptions of previous research and suggest that 
tax authorities should react to different motivations with tailored enforcement 
programs and should apply strategies in such a way that voluntary and especially 
committed motivations are enhanced. 
 
To change taxpayers’ motivations, the slippery slope framework suggests 
application of a tailored mix of coercive power (i.e., audits and fines) and 
legitimate power (i.e., fair procedures, information services, etc.). Tax authorities 
should apply coercive audits and fines in a legitimate and fair way to enforced 
motivated taxpayers in order to change their motivation into voluntary motivation 
(Hofmann, Gangl, et al., 2014). Tax authorities should avoid coercive audits and 
fines for voluntary and committed motivated taxpayers and should focus on 
legitimate services procedures to maintain and foster the positive motivations of 
these taxpayers. Examples of initiatives which foster committed motivations are 
fair procedures of tax collection and tax spending, enhanced service initiatives 
(telephone hotlines, websites, etc.), communication strategies presenting public 
goods such as schools which are financed with tax money, and the establishment 
of trust-based relationships with taxpayers (Alm & Torgler, 2011; Gangl et al., 
2015; Gangl et al., 2013). In the enhanced relationship program of the OECD 
(2013), tax authorities dispense with auditing taxpayers going back for several 
years. Instead, they try to resolve and settle uncertainties on tax issues 
immediately when taxpayers ask for advice. On the other hand, taxpayers agree to 
fully disclose their tax files and to sign a voluntary contract of fair play in which 
they agree to refrain from aggressive tax planning (OECD, 2013). This enhanced 
relationship involves trust, which can be harmed. However, it pays off in lower 
costs of auditing for tax authorities and importantly in enhanced planning 
reliability for taxpayers. As a consequence, taxpayers are assumed to feel 
respected as honest taxpayers and gain trust towards the tax authorities (Gangl et 
al., 2015). Thereby, taxpayers are assumed to develop a committed motivation to 
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pay taxes, which means a felt responsibility to be tax compliant. The present 
results provide evidence for these assumptions. 
 
The present paper has limitations. The present results only apply to developed 
countries with relatively high rates of tax compliance. To confirm and expand the 
generalizability of the present results, future studies should investigate the 
relationship between motivations and tax compliance in developed countries with 
relatively low rates of tax compliance. The explained variance of tax compliance 
differs in the Austrian and in the Dutch study. A reason for this difference might 
be the different way in which motivations were assessed. In the Austrian study 
seven-point Likert scales were used for each motivation whereas participants in 
the Dutch study had to choose between one of the three motivations. However, the 
direction of results is the same in both studies and the different measures applied 
to assess motivations also indicate that motivations have a robust relationship to 
tax compliance.  
 
Based on two studies on representative samples the present paper indicates that 
the distinction between different motivations to pay taxes seems to be a relevant 
factor for tax compliance. Tax authorities can be recommended to avoid actions 
which produce an enforced motivation and to foster initiatives which enhance a 
committed motivation to pay taxes in order to increase the number of citizens that 
comply. 
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